A benchmark payoff for a player is that his imputation under cooperation must at least be equal to his noncooperative payoff at each time instant along the cooperative path. A distribution formula that yields noncooperative-equivalent imputation in cooperative differential games is presented. An exegesis of the rationale of this formula is also given.
Introduction
Cooperative differential games represent a complex form of optimization analysis. The recent work of Petrosyan (2004 and 2006 ) developed a generalized method for the derivation of analytically tractable time-consistent solutions. A benchmark payoff for a player is that his imputation under cooperation must at least be equal to his noncooperative payoff at each time instant along the cooperative path. A distribution formula that yields noncooperativeequivalent imputation in cooperative differential games is presented. An exegesis of the rationale of this formula is also given.
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Mathematical Preliminaries
Consider the n− person nonzero-sum differential game with initial state x 0 and duration T − t 0 . The state space of the game is X ∈ R m , with permissible state trajectories {x(s), t 0 ≤ s ≤ T }. The state dynamics of the game is characterized by the vector-valued differential equations:
Where u i (s) ∈ R m i is the control vector of player i. The objective of player i is
and
and q i (x(T )) are non-negative. The players payoffs are transferable.
Invoking the work of Isaacs (1965) 
The noncooperative payoff of player i at time t given that x(t) = t is given by the continuously differentiable function V i (t, x) . Under cooperation group rationality required the players to maximize their joint payoff
subject to (1) . Let {ψ i (s, x), for i ∈ N} denote a set of strategies leading to an optimal control solution of the problem (1) and (3) 
In explicitly solvable cooperative differential games, continuously differentiable functions W (t, x * t ) and
The state dynamics under cooperation is:
The corresponding optimal trajectory under cooperation can be expressed as:
For notational convenience, we use the terms x * (t) and x * t interchangeably.
Noncooperative-Equivalent Imputation Formula
Consider the situation when all players agree to act so that a group optimum could be obtained. A benchmark payoff for a player is that his imputation must at least be equal to his noncooperative payoff at each time instant along the cooperative path {x To do this we let B i (s, x * (s)) denote the instantaneous rate of cooperative payment received by player i at time s . In particular, 
yield the noncooperative-equivalent imputation
Proof.
Using (7) one can obtain the identity:
Differentiating (8) with respect to τ yields
Invoking (5) we obtain
Hence Theorem 3.1 follows. Theorem 3.1 yields a distribution formula for noncooperative-equivalent imputation in a cooperative differential game with dynamics (1) and payoffs (2) . Such a formula can be obtained in closed form for any explicitly solvable games.
An Exegesis of the formula
In this section an exegesis of the ratioale for the noncooperative-equivalent imputation formula (11) is presented. Note that the Isaacs-Bellman equation in Theorem 2.1 for a feedback Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative game (1) and (2) leads to
Using (12) the distribution formula in (10) can be expressed as:
However, along the cooperative path{x * τ } T τ =t 0 , the instantaneous rate of payoff to player i is :
In order for player i to realize an instantaneous rate of payoff equaling B i (τ, x * τ ) a noncooperative-equivalent compensation formula can be obtained as
In formula (15) the term
yields the difference between player i s rate of instantaneous payoffs when he uses the noncooperative strategy and that when he adopts the cooperative 
τ )] yields the instantaneous change of the states over time if the agents act noncooperatively, while the term
τ )] yields the instantaneous change of the states over time if the agents act cooperatively. Hence, the expression
represents the compensation to player i when the change in the state variable follows the cooperative trajectory instead of the noncooperative path. To sum up, at time instant τ the compensation to player i leading to the noncooperative-equivalent instantaneous rate of payoff B i (τ, x * τ ) consists of (i) the compensation on the difference between player i s rate of instantaneous payoffs when he uses the noncooperative strategy and that when he adopts the cooperative strategy, and (ii) the compensation to agent i for the difference in the change in the state variable on the cooperative trajectory and that on the noncooperative path.
